Empirical Evidence for Collusion in the U.S. Auto Market? by Val Eugene Lambson & J. David Richardson
NEER WORKING PAPERS SERIES
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE POR COLLUSION IN THE OS. AUTO MARKET?
VaI Eugene Lambson
J. David Richardson
Working Paper No. 4111




In vanuua types of our research along these lines, we benefitsed greatly from comments by
Russeh Cooper, Dan Kovenock, Marvin Liebemsao, Alvin Kiovoniek, Kais Krishna, and Julio
Rotomberg. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Internadonal Trade and
Invostmonh Any opinions expressed are those of the authors artd not those of the National
Eureau of Economic Research.IDlER Working Paper #4111
June 1992
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE POR COLLUSION IN TEE U.S. AUTO MARKET?
ABSTRACT
A sopergame theoretic price-setting model of collusion is calibrsted to data frotn the
North Atteorican passengsr car market befoto, dosing, and after the voluntary restraint
arrangcmettts (YRAs) with Japan. Conclusions about whether she model is consistent with the
bans from the various regimes depend on assontptions about market structure, demand elasticities,
sod discs unt factors. If one believes that dte price elasticity of auto demand is about one, for
exutopbs, then the calibrations suggest Etat in, the pre-VR.A and VP,A regimes, only Oenerai
Motors and Pord could conceivably have colluded, and even this limited potential broke down
in the post-VRA regime.
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an'd fiBER1 introduction
This research examines whether conditions consistent with a familiar model of
impiscit collusion are sadsfied in data for the United States passenger car market during
each of three regimes, The model is a price-setting supergame with asymmetric capacity
constraints, in which excess capacity is taken to 'bnforce "the collusion. The three
regimes are aggregations of years: years prior to the Voluntary Restraint Arrangement
(VRA) 'with Japan; years during the time in which it waa hiudins; and years subsequent
to that time.
Our most important conclusion is that 'whether the nsodci appears bruadiy
consistent with the data depends on what one believes about demand elaancfty and on
what one believes about cartel membership. If one believes thut all three major US
firms and all three major Japanese firms colluded, then the model ma cuns:s:uut yrjmh the
data at very low elasticities of demand (as low as 17, .62, .30 mu the muspnc:mvu reaimes).
These are much lower than generally estimated. Furthermore, the hmgncst of them i5
suspect since the assertion that Japanese firms in the VRA period wore uoiiuding by
restricting output below VRA levels contradicts the evidence. If one bclmcvcs that only
the three major US firms colluded, timen the model is consistent with the data in a
narrow range of elasticities atove .64. .70, and .43 in the respective regimes. Finally, if
one believes that only Oenerai Motors and Ford colluded, a scusible belief if cue accepts
that Chrysler k pour financial cuncitiun made t an untrustworthy conspirator, then
elasticities that range up from i. ii, 1.16, and .73 in the respective regimes support the
mnodel. Hence, if one betmeves that elasticities of much less than one are unreascnabie,the data are consistent with the story that GM and Ford successfully colluded in the Pre-
VRA and VRA regimes but that their ability to collude was undermined in the Post-
VP_kregimeas Japanese firms engaged in significant direct foreign investment.
The methodoiogy of the research is to conduct fairly stmpie tests of necessary or
sufficient conditions from the modet in each regime. There are two advantages of
conducting the tests for several regimes. Repetition obviously enhances cur confidences
in the conclusions. Furthermore, ii is not unlikely that cartel membership differed across
regimes.
The research has two distinctive analytical features relative to the existing
titerature. Gne is the asymmetry across firms in capacity and excess capacity. The cther
is the consideration of 'bptimal "rules (penal codes) for enforcing collusion.
The research has two distinctive empirical features relative to the existing
ibterature. Gne is a technique for purging the observations of cyclicality, so as to create
a data set relevant for a stationary U.S.autoindustry in a sequence of equilibria,
punctuated by the beginning and end of the VRA,' The other is a technique fur
blending fragmentary firm-level and industry-level data to infer important, yet
unobservable, firm-level variables and parameters.
Gne of the most important assumptions that we maintain throughout the paper is
that the mix of model varieties, and the quality and non-price characteristics of each, are
sufficienity similar and stable across the colluding firms during each of the three regimes
that they may he aggregated into a single commodity. Empirical acceptance of this
assumpdon may be facilitated by the two-to-four year length of our regimes. That length
2was dictated by the timing of the VRA and the need to purge the data of cyclicality. All
things considered, there may be some tradeoff involved in forcing our chosen regime
iengths to reflect three things at once: cyclical stability, trade-policy regime, and
comparability of cross-firm product line.
2, Maximal Cotlnsion with Capacity Constraints
In his criticism of Cournot 's (1838) work, Bertrand (1883) asserted that firms
choose prices rather than quantities. In the real 'world firms usually choose both prices
and quantities, as well as qualities and other characteristics of their outputs. To assume
less is an abstraction and, as usual, the researcher 's problem is to select the most useful
abstraction.
To the extent that the level of production capacity is important, the Bertrand
price-setting model seems to be a superior analytical tool 10 the Cournot quantity-setting
model.2 Furthermore, voluntary restraint arrangements, such as those seen in the U.S.
automobile market during the 1980's, inhibit the foreign firm's ability to choose
quantities, leaving price as their main decision variable over time periods determined by
model mix, quality, and olher slow-to-change features, For Ihese reasons we find the
Bertrand price-setting model a useful abstraction to examine implicit collusion in the
U.S.automobileindustry, especially in the context of voluntary export restraints.
We model the major automobile manufacturers as engaging in collusion. Much
work in game theory has gone into developing formal models of collusion. It
demonstrates that players can sustain outcomes that are not consistent with static Nash
equilibria by adopting a penal code that instructs them how to behave after any deviation
3fr"m collusion an "edt af e' any deviation frr"n the edhavior specifiedby thepenal
code. To be effectisea penalcode must be credible, thatis,at each time period and no
n'rsier what has happened ;n tie part, it m:'rt be 'hat each playermaxinriaosthe present
dircounted value of his payoffs by obeying the penal code from then on, given that all
other players do likewise One example of a credible penal code is attributed to
Friedman (1971). His penal code instructs all players to choose static Nash strategies in
all periods following any devia'ion. The search for optimal penal codes that is. the
oredibie penal codes which most severely punish deviatinn and henoe can support the
rraximai possible collusion, was greedy advanoed by the 'york of Abreu (1988).Lambson
(1927. 1991) applied Abreu 's results 'o Bertrand games.
The model studied in this paper is one of asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly:
although the firms are assumed to have the same ma-ginsi cost, c, they have different
_apaoities, with k defined as the capaoity of firm i. They produce a cross-sectionally
hom'geneous product--an assumption which requires that the mix of model varieties and
'h' p ality of non-price characteristics of each be similar aid stable across ooiluding
rns during each of the three periods. To the extent that the firms compete in most of
tue ditferent product liner, and 10 the extent that they behave in each product line in a
way similar o the behavior postulated below, we might hope that the aggregated markets
will also be characterized by that behavior,
Firms are modeled as having an infinite horizon, 'with the (discrete) time periods
bring indexed by t. At the beginning of each period fl-ms choose prices for the period
rinu.lmnecuaiy. After firms announce prices consumers attempt to purchase from firmscharging the lowest price. Any unsatisfied demanders then attempt to purchase from
firms charging the next lowest price, and so on. If the lowest price firms do not have
sufficient capacity to supply the quantity demanded at their price, a rationing rule is
required to determine how their oulput is allocated among consumers. We adopt the
Levitan-Shubik (1972) rule which requires that consumers with higher reservation prices
be served first. This is the relevant rule if there is a secondary market for the good
because low reservation price consumers who acquire the good will in turn sell it to high
reservation price consumers. (Alternatively, the Levitan-Shubik rule can be thought of as
ignoring aggregate income effects.) Hence, if firm i is the only firm charging the price p
then its sates are mm (k, max [D(p) -E<k,OJ}where D(p) is total demand when all
firms charge p and where denotes summation over firms charging less than p. If two
or more firms charge p then their total sales are mm (Ek, max {D(p) -E,kt,O]),where
denotes summations over firms charging p. Firms charging the same price must agree
on how to divide sates,3
Let P =(p,..,Pa) be the vecter of prices charged by the firms. (It is
sometimes convenient to write P in the form (, PJ; the price before the sentieoion is
firm iS price and the price vector after the semicolon is the vector of other firms'prices.)
Then firm i's profit function, riP), is simply (p -c)times firm i's sates.
Let p(t,i) be a price, let P(t,i) =[p(t,i)p(t,i)], define the sequence of price
vectors i= {P(t,i)}, anddefine r= (q,,..p).Then iisa poishmnent (for player i)
and r is a (simple) penal code. Firms can agree on a penal code in order to sustain an
agreed upon collusive price, say .Ifany firm, say firm i, charges a price other than
5then, in the next period, flrms begin to follow the punishment prloe path described by r.
If any firm, say j (perhaps equal to i) deviates from i, then firms begin to follow the
punishment path described by .Ifa firm deviates from its own punishment path, its
punishment path is reimposed from the beginning.
Given a penal code,iet & c (O,i)be the flrm's discount factor and let V3(r1) =
s.&T14P(T,D] be the present value of profits to firm j if firm i's punishment path is
followed, discounted to the first period of the punishment.is çgjjj.. if for all i, all j,
and all T,
(2.1) r[P(T,i)] c.[P(T,i)] ￿ EL T+o ci[P(t,1)] -&VCs)
where ir[P3(T,i)] =supsr.(p;P)is firm j's ro.flt given P.Inwords, in each
period every firm prefers to have the punishment continued rather than to optimally
deviate and be psnished in turn. A penal code is optimal if it minimizes V1(r) for each
i subject to the oonstralnt that rbe credible. A price issu'stainable (by r if there exists
a division of the sales such that, for all i,
(2.2) 7(pp)- (p;p ,p)￿[&/(l-&)](p;pp)- &V(n),
that is, if each firm would prefer to have all firms charge p in each period than to
deviate from p and be punished.
Let P minimize ir(P1), sr(P) will be called i's no
matter 'what prices other firms charge, firm i can always achieve a profit of at leastin
each period, Similarly, firm i can guarantee itself a discounted profit stream worth at
6least 'i-/(l- ) which,accordingly, will be called firm i security level. If V(r1) =
theniisa gcrtcLty level punishment if iisa security level punishment for all i then r
isa ocudfvlevelpenal code
Lambson (1987) proved for symmetric Bertrand games (and for a very general
class of rationing rules) that if an optional penal code exists then a security level penal
code is credible, implying that optimal penal codes are security level penal codes. This
result does p hold in all asymmetric Bertrand games, but it is true that the largest firm
can always be driven to its security level, Namely, Theorem 2.1 isa special case of a
result found in Lambson (199l).
IbstortrtmZl: If i-is an optimal penal code and k =maxkthen V1() =V.
To see why it may not be credible to threaten to drive smaller firms to their
security levels, consider a very small firm with a security level close to zero. To hold
such a flrm to its security level, all firms would have to charge prices close to marginal
cost and hence garner profits close to zero. Large firms with high security levels may
find it in their best interest to refuse to go through with the punishment. Thus
Lmbson (1987) proof that optimal penal codes are security level penal codes does not
generalize from symmetric Bertrand games. However, Lambson (1991) establishes that
security level penal codes are credible if firms' capacities are not too different.
Furthermore, given the Levitan-Shubik mechanism, if
(2.3)ir(c,...,c)￿ Iir (p;p p)
7for all t and for some p sustainable by a security level penal code, then optimal penal
codes are security level penaL codes.6 ln any event, since each firm can guarantee itself
its security level, security level penal codes provide a bound on the severtty of
punishments and hence an upper bound on the maximal level of collusion,
1EmpiricalResearch Strategy
Explicit and implicit in the dynamic collusion that is modeled above are various
conditions that can be examined for empirical consistency. Two concern us here:
(i)Each colluding firm must grin more profits from the collusion than it could
guarantee for itself in isolation, In other words, each firm share of collusive profits
must exceed its one-period se-curity ievel. Though this may seem a very weak condition,
and thus easily consistent with the data, we found it unsatisfied in some cases for the
largest firms under 'base-case "parameterization.
(2)Each colluding firm must gain at least as much profit from supporting the
collusive pricing continuously than by 'defecting "and then being 'kunished "according to
the penal code governing the collusion. In other words, under security-level penal codes,
condition (2.2) must hotd, in which the ieft-hand side measures the one-period increment
over collusive profits from a firm defection, and the right-hand side measures the
discounted value of the indefinite sacrifice of collusive profits under punishment.
Since the discount factors are not directly observable, these equations can be sized
up against the data in two equivalent ways. 'Realistic "discount factors can be assumed,
and the equations can be examined directly by measuring other variables and parameters
as described in Section 4. Or the conditions can be Thaintained "as equations and solved
Sfor the discountfactors that would support such a maintained hypothesis. These implied
discount factors can then be evaluated for lheir realism. One advantageoflhe second
approach is its capacity for meaningful reinterpretation. The model implicitly identifies a
'keriod with the length of time it takes for rivals to detect a given firm S defection from
the collusion;7 discount factors that seem realistically to be too low correspond precisely
to 'defection-possibility periods "that seem too long to believe that an auto maker could
really hide underpricing and overproduction from its rivals.
Voluntary Restraint Arrangements that constrain the capacity of some firms will
reduce both (assuming a fixed collusive price): the temptation of each firm to defect
from the collusion o± the profits sacrificed under punishment (that is, the punishment
cost) that follows defection. In other words, the advent of VRAs, ceteris paribus, will
reduce both the left-hand and right-hand sides of condition (2.2); the attenuation of
VRAs wilt raise both sides. Collusive prices' itt endogenously adjust. An illustration of
the component parts of condition (2.2)isgiven in table 3.1. Even though other things
are not equal across regimes, it is interesting that the respective sides of (2.2) change in
the implied direction 75percentof the time for large U.S. firms.
A voluntary restraint arrangement can be interpreted as a policy to reduce the
capacity avaitable to the firms 'which are bound by the arrangement. The effects of
imposing a VRA can thus be storied by analyzing the effects of changes in the firms'
capacities, Two questions are central. First, how does the arrangement affect the firms'
ability to collude? Second, how does the arrangement affect the collusive profits of the
varsous firms?Consider an arrangementthataffects only one firm, say j.Insteadof being
aisowed to sell up to k. firm jisconstrained to sell no more than 5) <k1. This has two
effects on collusion. First, the ability of firm jtopunish the other firms is reduced; that
is, the security levels of the other firms tend to rise. This decreases the right hand side
of (22)forall iand a fixed collusive price, p. This effect tends to work ggjns
collusion, so only less profitable colibsive prices can be sustained. The second effect, on
the other hand, words f.ctL collusion; firm jfindsit less profitable to cheat on a collusive
agreoment. In the absence of the restraint agreement, firm jwouldreceive srp,...p) =
(o-c)kif it deviated optimally from the collusive agreement. With the VRA in place,
however, it can only receive r,...,p)= @-c)v. Hence the demand allocation in
collusion can give less output to firm i and more to the other firms. This makes it more
attractive to the other firms to abide by the agreement so more profitable collusive
prices are sustainable. Nothing can be said about which effect will dominate.
4gtaDngcrijon.
To calibrate the model and perform the tests described above, we sought three
data sets, corresponding tb regimes before, during, and after the YRA with Japan. The
regimes are distinguished from each other in the model by the way the VRA constrains
the capacity of Japanese firms to defect from the collusion and to punish the other
defectors. Thus in empirical calibration, we sought a configuration that allowed capacity
to differ across regimes, yet that forced other fundamental exogenous variables (demand
curves, costs) to remain stationary within regimes, Cyclically was purged from the data
to the degree that stationarity was achieved. This procedure required some creative
toaggregation over time, since the inner boundaries of the regimes needed also to
represent the advent and attenuation of the VRA.
To obtain a 're-VRA data set9, we averaged passenger car figures for 1979,
1980, and 19811. This had the advantage of combining acknowledged 'good 'and "cad
periods for the U.S.industry,and of creating a 1979-811 average that was remarkably
similar in the aggregate (except capacity) to data for 198111 through 1985, which we used
for our 'hsid-VRA "measures, and to data for 1986 through 1989, which we used for our
'ost-VRA "measures. The similarity encompassed not only quantities and parameters of
the demand curves, but also a form of approximate stationarity for disaggregated prices
by firm.'° The resulting data and parameters are recorded in Table 4.1
The most difficult challenge was to calibrate tirm-by-firm capacity for each of the
three regimes, Explicit firm-by-firm data are confldential, Available aggregates for the
industry as a whole have conceptual problems (e.g., many measure all motor vehicles, not
just passenger cars) and questionable accuracy (e.g., several are simple linked peaks of
production series). For the pre-VRA and mid-VRA regimes, we relied instead on
USITC (1980, l985a) for industry-level capacity, K', and then allocated K among six







Production data for the U.S. firms was collected for each of the years 1969 through 1985
from MYMA (1989), Wards (1984, 1986, 1988) and AN (1985). A graphical smoothing
11method was used to oalcuiate a measure we call 'bverage peak produotion 'for eaoh U.S.
firm for each year during the entire period (the measure was aiways greater than or
equal to actual production). By assuming thst the ratio of 'average peak produotion "to
oapaoity was identioai aoross U.S. firms15, we were abie to allocate reoorded industry
capaoity among them aooording to time trends in their peak produotion figures. For the
post-VRA regime we relied on Federal Reserve System (1990) for the growth rates of
aggregate capacity for passenger cars and light trucks, appiying these rates successively to
our i985 figure for keal "passenger car capacity.
tf only large U.S. firms are hypothesized to collude, only data in their capacities
are necessary. if, in addition, large Japanese firms are hypothesized to collude then data
on their capacities to import are also necessary. Capacity for imports was initially hard
to conceive. In an extreme view, all global production could be dumped into the U.S.
market--more than 20 million vehicles a year outside the United States. We resolved
instead to try something less extreme and consistent with our underlying model. For the
pre-VRA period, we assumed that a relevant measure of capacity utilization for the
Japanese firms selling imports was an interpolation between capacity utilization rates for
American Motors 'and Volkswagen North American operations and for Chrysler,
calculated as above. Since Japanese firm sales tended to fall between the two, this
reflected a reasonable posture that capacity utilization rates be identical for identically
sized firms, For the mid-VRA period, we assumed that Japanese firm import capacity
'was actual imports, being constralned by the VRA. For the post-VRA regime Japanese
flrm capacity in the North American market was constructed by summing: (i) published
i2accounts of North American capacity built by Toyota, Nissan, and Honda during 1986-89;
and (ii) ongoing VRA allotments for each firm, even when not binding. We emphasize
that these calculations of import capacity do not enter our tests of hypothesized collusion
among large U.S. firms alone.
Calculated capacities and capacity utilization rates based on these procedures are
recorded in Table 4.2.
5.EmpiricalCalibration and Results
All theories of collusion that assume the usual form of individual rationality
necessarily require that each firm receive collusive profits that are at least as large as its
security level, that is, each firm must receive profits at least as large as the profits that it
can guarantee for itself independently of the actions of the other firms. Of course, if
punishments are never triggered there is no direct way to observe firms' security levels.
If, however, linear demand is assumed and the Levitan-Shubik rationing rule adopted,
security levels can be deduced. Specifically, under the Levitan-Shubik rationing rule firm
i has a guaranteed residual demand given by
(5,1) d(p) =max[0, a -bp-K]
where p is firm iprice and Km represents the capacity of icompetitors. If the
firm b own capacity constraint is not binding, then its profit from servicing its residual
demand curve can be expressed as
(5.2) (p) =(p-c)max [0, (a-bp-K)],
13which, if a-bc-K; taO, it maximizes when price is p =(ahc-K/2b,If its capacity
constraint is binding when it services its residual demand curve by charging p, that is if
Is1 ￿(a-bc-K)12, thenit maximizes profits from its residual demand curve by charging
p** =(a-k1-K1)/b,that is, by charging the price such that its capacity is exactly
demanded. Thus, firm Lb one-period security level is
(i3)=(a-bc-K)2/4b if Is1 ta(a-bc-K,)12and a-bc-K, taO
=0 ifk ta(a-bc-K1)12 and a-bc-K,
(a-bc-K1-k1)(k,/b) if k1 ￿(a-bc-K1)/2,
Asdiscussed in section 4, each regime is treated scparately, The data themsetves
cstabhsh a point on the demand curve. Assuming linearity, the demand curve is then
comtetety determined by its elasticity. The demand curve and the data on firm
capacity, in tum, determine the security levels of the firms through (53). The data also
provide the profits of the firms. The theoretical requirement that all the firms 'collusive
profits exceed their security levels puts a restriction on which demand elasticities are
consistent with both the data and the theory. The ranges of consistent elasticities are in
Tabie 5. l These ranges depend on very little more than linearity: given linearity, ny
model satisfying a weak form of individual rationality will imply these restrictions.
Calculations were made for each of the three regimes under three different
assumptions pertaining to market structUre, The three assumptions were, respectively,
(1) that alt six of the major automobile cocrations were colluding, (2) that all three of
the major US, automobile corporations were coituding, and (3) that only General
14Motors and Ford were colluding. Firms that were assumed not to be colluding were
assumed not to be threatening to use anyexcesscapacity in punishing a deviate colluder;
hence, the result of dropping a colluder is a reduction in K for each remaining
colluder, °Apriori, the case for the first assumption seems strongest in the pre-VRA
and post-VRA episodes; during the VRA episode the Japanese firms were constrained
by the VRA 's and hence had limited ability to expand output to punish deviation (as well
as limited ability to expand output to deviate). if one takes the view that the Japanese
in the pre-YRA and/or post-VRA period were striving to penetrate the U.S. market,
making them unlikely conspirators in any collusive agreement, then assumption 2 might
seem most reasonable, Finally, if one believes that the tenuous financial condition of
Chrysler during some episodes would have made it an unreliable partner in collusion,
assumption 3 might seem most reasonable.
Given the ranges of elasticities in Table 5.l,one can use (2.2) to consider whether
the data are broadly consistent with security level penal codes. If security level penal
codesareemployed, then V) =i-/(t-J) where J is defined in (5.3). Deviation from
the high collusive price is optimally accomplished by undercutting one co-conspirators
and producing up to capacity; hence 5r =(p-c)k.Finally, if firms maximize joint profits
subject to (2.2) and if the nionopoly price is not sustainable then (2.2) holds with
equalIty, thus determining J.
The collusive profit s(f;p,..., p)is, by assumption, what is observed in the data.
Hence, iming that (2.2) holds with equality for each colluding firm (i.e., maintaining
that collusion exist, that it maximizes joinl profits, and that security level
15punishments are credible for all firms) and summing (2.2) over colluding firms, one can
solve for the 'bverage "discount factor, 3, implied by the data and the model 's
assumptions. The discount factors for the extremes of the elasticity ranges for each
regime and each market structure assumption are in Table 5.2.
These data-consistent, model-consistent average discount factors seem on balance
much too low to be believable. Even the most plausible (that is, the largest) of these
discount factors correspond to 'defection-possibility periods "that are six to eighteen
months in length, depending on firms 'rates of time preference.It is hard to believe that
auto rivals v.outd remain passive in the face of significantly increased sales by a defector
for this long a period before detecting the 'Infraction. "and responding to it. Smaller
discount factors, of course, correspond to even longer and mere incredible defection
periods.
However, these discount factors are derived assuming that all firms can credibly
be driven to their security levels, This assumption is i implied by the theory, which
only guarantees that the iatgest firm can be so severely punished and, hence, that (2.2)
holds with equality only for GM. Table 5.3 contains the discount factors for GM given
the exrremes of the elasticity ranges for each regime and each market structure
assumption. HInevery case, GM 'h implied discount factor approaches one as the
elasticity of demand approaches the lower bound of the consistent elasticity ranges
exhibited in Table Si. Elasticities close to those lower bounds (that is, within about .01)
correspond to detection periods of a fe'.v months or Iess '.vith the length of the detection
period approaching rem as the elasticity approaches the tower bound. Thus for the
i6reader who accepts the lower elasticity bounds as reasonable (for a market structure
assumpteon that he or she also considers reasonable) the data are broadly consistent with
the theory.
gglusio
The above model of dynamic imperfect competition in an asymmetric Bertrand
oligopoly can be construed as broadly consistent with data on the firms producing
passenger cars for the U.S. market between 1979 and 1989. One conclusions on this
point will depend on what he or she believes about automobile demand elasticity and
market structure,
Without reference to any particular theory, and requiring only linearity and a
minimal notion of individual rationality, the data imply that automobile demand
elasticities fell somewhere between 0.17 and 7.05 during the sample period (see Table
5.1). This is, no doubt, a large range. On the other hand, it contains any reasonable .
wQaopinion on what automobile demand elasticities were without containing numbers
above the single digits. The method of data construction in no way required this
outcome in advance, so some confidence in this method is justified.
Further restrictions on the demand elasticity imposed by the theory (along with
the belief that it would take no more than a few months, at the very most, for firms to
detect deviation from collusion) lead one to focus on the lower end of the elasticity
ranges implied by linearity and individual rationality. Whether one finds the model
consistent weth the data then depends on what one believes about demand elasticities
and market structure. For example, if one believes that the elasticity of automobile
17demand is about one, Table 5.1 suggests that in the PreGTBA and VRA regimes oniy
GM and Ford were able to ooliude and the ooliusion broke down in the Fost-YRA
regime. This is oonsistent with the story that Chrysler S tenuous financial oondition made
it an untrustworthy partner throughout the eighties, that Japanese firms esohewed
ooitusion in the Fre-VRA regime as they attempted to penetrate the American market
and were prevented from being oollusive partners by trade restraints during the VRA
regime, and that all firms lost the ability to ooliude in the oompetitive environment
foilowing the VRA as Japanese capacity in the United States became significant. By
contrast, if one is willing to entertain lower automobile demand elasticities, the data are
consistent 'with even larger automobile cartels.
18REFERENCES
Abreu, D. (1986), External Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, "Journal of
Economic Theo 39, 191-225.
_______(1988),'On the Theory of Infinitety Repeated Games with Discounting,
Econometrica 56.2, 383-396.
Automotive News, AN (1985), 1985 MarkeaBojssu.
Bertrand, J. (1883), Revue de Theorie mathematique de ta richesse sociale "et
Recherches sur les pnncipes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses, "gj.
499-508.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1981), Departures from Marginal-Cost Pricing in the American
Automobile Industry, "Journal of Econometrics ,17,20 1-227,
Brock, W. and 1. Scheinkman (1985), Price-Setting Supergames with Capacity
Constraints, "Review of Economic StudiOL 52, 371-382.
Cournot, A. (1838), let principes mathematiques de Ia theorie des
richesse. Hachette, Paris.
Davidson, C. and R. Deneckere (1984), Horizontal Mergers and Collusive Behavior,
117-132.
Domowitz, I., R. G. Hubbard, and B. C. Petersen (1987), 'Oligopoly Supergames: Some
Empirical Evidende on Prices and Margin, "Journal of Industrial Economics .35,
379-398.
Dixit, A. (1986), 'Optimal Trade and Industrial Policies for the U.S. Automobile
Industry, "in Feenstra (1988),
Edgeworth, F. (1925), fhe Pure Theory of Monopoly, "in: Edgeworth, Francis Y.,
Relating to Political g.ncmy,., vol. 1, Macmillan, London, 111-142.
Feenstra, R. C. (l984), 'Voluntary Export Restraint in U.S. Autos, 1980-81: Quality,
Employment, and Welfare Effects, "in Robert E. Baldwin and Anne 0. Krueger,
eds., The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
________(1985a),'Automobile Prices and Protection: The U.S.-Japan Trade Restraint,
Journal of Policy Modeling .7,49-68.
19________ (19855)'QuaIi'y Cbsrpe Under TrYe Resrtrtnts; Theoryand Evidencefrom
Japanese Au"s. CoI'mvta University Department of Economies Working Paper
NO 298, August.
_________(t928a1,'OaThs "mm Trade In Differentiated Products; Japanese Compact
Trucks, Un Feenstra 'i;88b',
________(i%88Nmririoa1.M435oiortnternationai Trade,, Cam£bdge,
Massachuse'ts: MIT Press,
Prledman, 3. (1971). 'A Noneosperative Equilibrium for Supergames, "gyjwf
pQic Studies. 38, 1-12.
Hetpman. B. and P. R. Krugman (1,939). 3ThrikaPBiiEc and M-,rkt Structure Cambridge.
Massachssetts: MiT Presn
Iwand T. and D. Rosenbaum (1988;, 'Cyclical Pricing inSuperpames with Capacity
Constrd,.ss, 'Departmentof Economics Working Par No. 88-4. University of
Nebraska, Pebruary.
Props, D. and 3 Soheinkman (1983), 'Cournot Precommitment and Bertrand
Competiti os Yield Coumot Outcomes. "Bell Journal of Economies .August.
Lan,bson, V. (1987), 'Optimal Penal Codes in Price-Setting Supergames, "Review of
Poonomlo Studies, 54, 385-398.
(1951), 'Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetrie Be- rand Supergames, "Brigham
Young University Working Paper No. 91-03.
t,evi'm R. and M. Shubik (1972;, 'Price Duopoly and Cap"Thty Constraints,
Ipternational Eoonomio Review. 13, lli-t22,
M -VehiclesManufacturers Association, MVMA (1985), Facts and Figures 1985.
R'en'herg J. and 0. Saioner (1986), 'A Supergame-Theoretie Model of Price Wars
During Booms, "American Economic Review, 76, 309-407.
______(i989a),'The Cyclical Behavior of Strategic Inventories, "QswigrjyjonrngiL
Puc'nomics. 114, 73-97
i9S9h, 'Quotas vs. Tariffs with Impheit Coilusion, "Canadian Joumal of
3cnpmfus 22. 237 244.
20Selten, R. (1975), 'Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Euilibrium Points in
Extensive Games, "International JournalofGame Theory. 4, 22-25.
Tirole, J. (1989),The Theoryof Industrial OrganizVion Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MITPress.
USITC (1980), Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis Therefore Publication1110
of the United States International Trade Commission, Washington, December.
_________ (1985a), The International:zation of the Automobile Industry and Its Effects on
the US. Automobile Industry, Publication 1712 of theUnited States International
Trade Commission, Washington, June.
_________ (1985b), IhS, Automobile industry: US Factory Sales,Retail Sales,
Impps, Expos. Apparent cEflsstmntjon Suesested Retail Prices, and Trade
Balances for Selected Countries in Motor Vehicles,1964-84,Publication 1762 of
the United States International Trade Commission, Washington, October.
Ward 'sCommunicationsIncorporated(1984,1986, 1988),Ward b Automoti'LYearbkTABLE 3.1
CALCULATEDCOLLUSIVE PROFITS, SECURiTY LEVELS,
DEFECTION PROFITS, AND PUNISHMENT LOSSES
SIX-FIRM COLLUSION IN PRE AND POST VRA REGIMES
THREE-FIRM COLLUSION IN VRA PERIOD REGIME
Demand price elasticity =3.00
Cost =Methodi calculation
Collusive Security Defection Punishment
Proflts Profits Temptation Cost
Per Per (One Fer
Period Period Period) Period il
General Motors 5.307 2.361 1,243 2.946
Ford 1.927 0.467 1.059 1.460
Chrysler 0.919 0133 0736 0.786
Toyota 0.627 0.079 0.669 0.548
Nissan 0.565 0.075 0.720 0.490
Honda 0.425 0.008 0.069 0.417 1lII-
General Motors 6.547 4.753 1.766 1.794
Ford 2.392 1.458 0.933 0.934
Chrysler 1.555 1.032 0.809 0.523
Toyota 0.843 0.390 na. n.a.
Nissan 0.762 0.368 na. na.




General Motors 5962 3918 2.644 2.044
Ford 2.924 1.328 1.251 1596
Chrysler 1.814 0740 0.796 1074
Toyota 1.017 0.299 0.576 0,718
Nissan 0.779 0.299 0.295 0.480
Honda 0.982 0.311 0.134 0.671
23TABLE C
DATA AND PAP AMTTERS
Pre BRA MidBRA I/RA
£JflSJJI Qi$11L$Oiioiit
Quantity (D( ' 9.714 9.067 11999
Price Q)i $3045 $10269 <L0337
Ccst (0), method i $7880 $8743 $8775'
Cost(c).6 method ii $4734 1199 $5t09
Ease-case marker 1.00 .90 1.9°
elasticity of demand
for autos
...inplied demand-crrve 19,43 19 33 7 .1 7
intercept (a)
...implied demand-come -10.74 -9 41
slooe (B dmes 94
Annual. average of U.S. and Canadian production for the U.S. market and U.S.
retail sales of import models. Por details see separate appendix available from the
authors.
Average consumer expenditure per new car from MVMA (1986, p. 38" adjmted for
changes in the overall consumer orion index between 1982 and year t --hencein '1982
purchasing power.
Approximation based on col. 2 times relative CPI of new autos to all items.
Estimated materials and payroll costs from USITC (i985a, pp. 39-40) and U.S.
Department of Commerce (1986, p. 769), also adjusted for changes in the overall
consumer price index be'm'een 1982 and year t --hencein 1982 purchasing power. For
detasis see separate appendix available from the authum.
6 Cost estima'e based on the assumption that lowest-price models were priced at
marginal 0051 (o); lowest-price-model data from USlTC (1985b), also adjusted for
changes in the overall consumer price index between 1982 and year t--henre in '2982
purchasing power. "Pordetails see separate appendix avallabie from the aothurs.
Experiments with alternative values of the elasticity wore performed, an' are
described in Section 5. These altematives imply of course. ccmospcnding vIces of
sntereept (a) and slope ('0).
24TABLE 4.2
CAPACITY AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION


























Six-Grm collusion 0.17 to 5.51
U.S. big-tOrso collusion 0.64 to 4.69
U.S. big-two collusion 1.11 to 4.46
Mid -YEA (19 SJJLfl
Six-firm collusion 0.62 to 4,94
U.S. big tOrso collusion 0.70 to 4.68
US. big-two collusion 1.15to 4.39
Six-firm collusion 0.30 to 7.05
OS. big-Circe collusion 0.43 to 6.39
U.S. big-two collusion 0.73 to 5.30
26TABLE 5.2
DATA-CONSISTENT,MODEL-CONSISTENT





U.S. big-two cotiusion 0.68 and 0.73
A(l9nlIIsg
Six-firm coliusion 0.40and0.66
U.S. big-three coJiuson 0.49 and 0.74
U.S. big-two coltus1on 0.06 and 0.84
RAi959-80
Six-firm coiiusiun 0.29 and 0.79
U.S. big-three collusion 0.43 and 0.86
U.S. big-two collusion 0.58 and 0.83TABLE 5.3
DATA-CONSISTENT,MODEL-CONS1STENT
DISCOUNTFACTORS FOR OM AT
EXTREME CONSISTENT ELASTICITIES
RA 1979-SIT'
Six-firm collusion 037 and 1.0
U.S. big-three collusion 0.47 and 1.0
U.S. big-two collusion 0,59 and 1.0
-VRA(i98ii1-5'
Six-firm collusion 0.63 and 1.0
U.S. big-three coilusion 0.63 and 1.0
U.S. big-twu collusion 0,77 and 1.0 RAl9
Six-firm ouliusion 1.0 and 1.0
U.S. big-three collusion 1.0 and 1.0
U.S. big-two collusion 1.0 and 1.0
28FOOTNOTES
1. This sets our researan ap< rt fru:n the seseral papers on how Inc tr.es'ivos tar
stability of implicit coltuston vary over cyclical peaks and trougha. S... for
example, Rotemberg and Saloner (19s6, 1989o, Donowita, Hubbard, an
Petersen (1987), and I,vand and Rosenb..um .T88;.
2.See Davidson and Deneckere (1984).
3.In the collusive equilibria deaenibed below, any flrm doviating from agreed yen
behavior does so by cnrging a price different from that charged by toy other
firm. Thus it is unnecessary to specIfy few cooperatIng firms divdc sates witn ar.
uncooperative firm chargIng the same prIce. See La:u5on(IvY.).
4.The modei explorell in Larabsa: Ocd5 is more gercrcia h c sndei s:pIOo
here.
5. Thismodel may be one way to fornatizo the notIon cf a saarli n.n4ocr of
dominant firms that share the a.araet with a bcmptY.e frlna. tta a.embers of
which are too small for tne lage firms to bother with.
6. Construct h by having alt fir... o...t firm i charge o fir wsc parlad .YIlc firm i
charges the prico (less than r u4..a to c) such tnnt, glia. :.e (s...t.a3ole) prOc
and dilLon of sates fctlowirg tIc first period of Inc p..n'lh.nat I, fIrm lb
discountod 1ayoff equals V1.I.tamityverIfIed, rum Iia 1a ... Uand V.
=tr(c (iT, that his isaredible, security icC. 5cn.. ama.
7.See, for exalt pie Tirale t989, pp. 248, 250252) bor a:5 intog rattio: of what 4
periodyjsf. moan, given d.c model.
8.Brock and Schelnkman (1985) show that wher. firms .agaclt.es arc constrasned to
be identical the effects of capacity changes on P.o s..Jainabilhy of uolluslon are
nonmonotonic.
9.Details of the steps descrtoed in tho rca. It,der at Sec.sen 4 are ava.labtc fr.cm :no
authors in a separate data appendix.
tO.To be specific, each regime b distrlbattcr. o p.mas rcm firms was qtc snm
from year to year, consistent with our .ss.spacn th3t ...tn.cbites are acrasm
sectionally homogeneous good (see i:.trudmton1,
11.Such data were supplied by U.S. firms as ef an ssvastlgatien by tao
International Trade CommIssion, on .a:t'nntO.: t .ey 5e kept m.ntidcatO..
Commissien pb.i had arty tao 3ggrc a..a f.g.rcs far m. ''.9. firms12.This assumption would make sense if peaks represented surges of aggregate
demand that took all colluding producers by surprise, and allowed all to produce
temporarily at levels comparably close to full capacity.
13.K1 was calculated as the sum of the capacities of the colluders and the sales of the
noncolluders,
14. GM discount factor is a U-shaped function of the elasticity. Changing the
elasticity means rotating the demand curve through the observed (collusive) point.
Increasing elasticity thus reduces (increases) profitability to the left (right) of the
observed point. At low (high) elasticities optimal deviation from marginal cost
pricing occurs at prices above (below) the observed point so at low (high)
elasticities the security level falls (rises) as elasticity increases. The result is a U-
shaped function with the maximum security level (and hence the maximum
discount factor) in the consistent range occurring at one (or both) of the end
points.
30Data Appendix
Empirical Evidence for Collusion
In the U.S. Aoto Market
Val Eugene Larnhson
I. David Richardaon
(1)Table 4.1. Row 1.
D( )= S, where
5ua = SF + Sc + fit =eathnatedNorth American passenger car production
(units) by U.S. firms for the U.S. market (plus North American production of Volkswagen);
SJ = S5 + + 5,, = U.S. passenger cas production (units) by Japanese firma for
the U.S. market p)pg retad sales (undsy of imported passenger cars irs the U.S. market by non-
U.S. firma;
and where
50M' 5F' 5C'5r1= estimated North American passenger car production (units) by
General Motors (GM), Ford (F), Chrysler (C), and residual North American resident, nom








2.= annualmeasured U.S. production by GM. F, C, and residual r,oJ'>rs fru.u. i98.
196. and l9S vr'sUus of War3's Automotive Yearbook, and frm The Wail. Street Journal
of ScC!89 A2' 9/18/89 (Ad) 11/20/89 A2), 2/9/90 (AT, 6/15/90 C9 and 0,24/90 (Bl0'
M X =netU.S. imports (units) by U.S. finns from Canadian. affiliates: J978-84
figau'cs frrm rSfC (198Th, table 28. p. 46); 1985-88 figures from 1987. 1987. 1989 an3
1096 editions of Motor vehicles Manufacturers Association (MVMA) World Mott XghLie
Dara, and from MYMA fgtean3 Fl urea86;
and where
im 5N s =U.S.passenger car produerion (units) p9 retail sales un'ts1 uni;ur '0
passenger cars in the U.S. market by Toyota ('F), Nissan (N), and Honda (H): l'i'8 5 figure
from USITC (i985b, pp. 11-14) pa N and H production from 1986 version of yg9g
Automotive Yearbook; 1986-88 figures from 1990 edition of MYMA orimMrtor Vehjgle
Data, passenger car retail sales of U.S-built units pfldi imported units by T, N, and Ii; 1989
figure from cealing 1988 figure by 1988-89 growth rate of sales cf Japanese passcr'grr ens
and light trucks from Wall Street Journg, 4/24/90 (Al);
=retailsales of imported passenger cars by "residual" foreign suppliers, where
'residual" excludes T, N, and H, and where "foreign" excludes sales of imported mAts by
GM. F, and C: 1978-85 figures from USITC (1985b. pp. 11-14); 1986-88 figures from 1996
edition of MVMA World Motor Vehicle Data; 1989 figure set equal to the arithmetic average
for 1986-88.
a(2) Table4.1. Row 2.
=P1'5CP152/CPI1), where
F, =averageconsumer expenditure per new passenger ear; 1978-85 figures from
MVMA Facts and Figures '86; 1986-89 figure from sealing 1981ffl-85 average by the rate of
inflation in the consumer price index for new autos between the 1986-89 period and the
1981ffl-85 period;
CF152, CFk =consumerprice index for all items in 1982 and year t,respectively,frons
various issues of the Feonomie Report of the President.
(3)Table 4.1. Row 3.
et =e,tet/et)4CPI51/CFl)
where
e,t =payrollplus cost of materials for motor vehicles and ear body equipment
industy; 1978-83 figures from U.S. Deparnnent of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1986, Table 1382, p. 769, drawn from earlier
Census.,. and Annual Survey of Manufactures; 1984-85 figures, see below; 1986-89 figure
from sealing 198 1112-85 average by the rate of inflation in the consumer price ind.ex for new
amos beeen the 1986-89 period and die 1981111-85 period;
c1/e5 =ratioof r, frons above to "cost of goods sold' by U.S. operations of GM, F.
C, American Motors Corporation. Volkswagen, nod Honda; 1978-84 figures for e, from
USITC (1985a, pp. 39-40), 1985 figure for r1, sealed op from 1984 figure by 1954-85 rate of




c2 =sales-weighredaverage across six firms of the suggested retail price for the
lowest-priced model produced by (3M. F, C, T, N, and H; 1978-85 figures from USITC
(1985b, pp. 22-25); 198689 figure front scaling the 198 lffl-85 average by the rate of
inflation in the consumer price index for new autos between the 1986-89 period and the
1981ffl-85 period;
CP152, CM1 =seeabove under (2),
(5)IkS2"Cgnaeitv" column.
k for i =GM,F, C =(Kus!Sus)fi
where




CU05 =aggregatecapscity utilization rate for U.S. producers; 1978 figure from
USITC (1980, p. A-31); 1979-84 figures from USITC (1985a, p. 44); 1985 data from l.JSITC:and for 1986-89= arithmeticaverage of Kus for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, where each was
1985 Kua scaled by the rate of growth in industrial capacity for autoa and light trucks from






tfori =GIvI,F,C=eachf's average peak production =thesum of each year's
four quarters of linearly interpolated production (s, see above for definition and source)
between "peaks"; peaks 'were detennined graphically, with each finn having obvious peaks
around 1978 and 1984; thcrafter, a succession of declining peaks for CM and C and nsildiy
rising peaks for F; grapha are available on request from the authors;
k1 for i =T,N.
for 1978 -1981II =averageof linear interpolation of 1975-76 capacity of American
Motors Corporation (AMC, roughly the sante sire supplier as TN at that time) and C
capacity in 1981 (roughly the same supplier size as T,N at that time), where capacity for
AMC was determined analogously to GM, F, and C above;
for 1981 ifi -1985=actuals =voluntaryrestraint quantity detennined by
government of Japan from Wall Street Journal, 4/14/88.
for 1986-89 =sumof voluntary reatramt quantity detennincd by government of
Japan (see immediately above) and average annual U.S. production capacity determined irons
reports in Wall Street Journll, 3/9/87 (p.10) and 4/20/90 (A5), and in the Economist, 4/18/89,with linear interpolation for unpredicted years between 1986 and 1992, (Nunimi production
capacity allocatedto T).
k1 for i =H
for 1978-1981 H =AMCcapacity p)p Volkswagen North American capacity (H
was roughly the same size supplier as AMC pj,py Volkswagen during this period), where
capacity for AMC and Volkswagen were determined analogously to GM, F, and C above;
for i981 1H -1985=seeT, N above for import share of I-I capacity pjy,g Nonh
American production for H, from Wall Street Joumal, 2/24/84 (p.2), 5/14/84 (plO), 2/14/86
(p.!);
for 1986-89, see method above for T, N.
(6) Jlc 4.2, 'Capacity Utthzatiotk column.
cu =capacityutilization rates for each finn in respective periods =(sik)'lOO,where
for
s, see above under (1).
see immediately above.
Raw numerical data are available from the authors upun request.DATA APPENDIX REFERENCES
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